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The ABCs and NTBs of GMOs: The
Great European Union-United States
Trade Debate-Do European
Restrictions on the Trade of
Genetically Modified Organisms
Violate International Trade Law?
Sarah Lively*
The debate about the use of Genetically Modified technology continues, with
daily news of claims about the safety or the risks. The public's reaction shows
instinctive nervousness about tampering with nature when we do not know all
the consequences. There are unanswered questions that need to be asked
-about the need for GM food, its safety, the environmental consequences,
consumer choice, and the usefulness to feed the world's growing population.
- The Prince of Wales
I. INTRODUCTION
Humans have been "tinkering" with agriculture for over ten thousand
years.2 Throughout the ages, we have poked and prodded to create the ideal
agricultural product. Today, with advances in knowledge, science, and
technology, scientists have nearly created what some believe to be the per-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2003, Northwestern University School of Law. The author would
like to give special thanks to Professor Michael G. Schechter at Michigan State University,
James Madison College, for sharing his wealth of knowledge on International Relations and
for helping to get this article off the ground. She would also like to thank Richard E. Lively
for his editing and re-editing of, not only this comment, but the hundreds of papers she has
passed on to him throughout her life.
1 The Prince of Wales, Questions About Genetically Modified Organisms, THE DAILY
MAIL, June 1, 1999, available at http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/speeches/
agricultureOl061999.html.
2 Joshua M. Stone, Restraints on Competition Through the Alteration of the Environment
at the Genetic Level, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 704 (2000).
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fect crop, and they have done so by altering individual plants at the genetic
level.
The genetic engineering of agriculture has spurred a lively worldwide
discussion, and the technology has found both enthusiastic fans and formi-
dable foes. Specifically, the United States has signed on as a proponent of
the genetic modification of agriculture.3 In fact, the United States has be-
come the largest producer of genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") and
is consequently the leading exporter of genetically modified goods.4 On the
other side of this debate lies the European Community ("EC"). The Euro-
pean Community is much less enthusiastic about GMOs and effectively
questions their presence in our environment and food products. 5 The Euro-
pean Community has focused on the risks that GMOs potentially pose to
environmental and human health, and accordingly, have regulated GMO
trade. These markedly different positions have created strained trade rela-
tions between the United States and the European Community.
The European Community believes that, in light of the "scientific un-
certainty" 6 and consumer mistrust 7 surrounding GMOs, it is of utmost ne-
cessity to regulate GM goods in order to protect and preserve consumer and
environmental health. 8 The United States points out that the risks posed by
GMOs are only "potential," and that the prospective benefits of GM agri-
culture may be too great to sacrifice to precautionary measures. 9 It appears,
then, that the United States believes the European Community's GMO
regulation scheme to be simply thinly veiled protectionism in violation of
international trade law,' 0 which ultimately reigns supreme over Community
3 See generally John S. Fredland, Unlabel Their Frankenstein Food!: Evaluating a U.S.
Challenge to the European Commission 's Labeling Requirements for Food Products Con-
taining Genetically-Modified Organisms, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 183 (2000).
4 See Bryan Endres, GMO: Genetically Modified Organism or Gigantic Monetary Obli-
gation? The Liability Schemes for GMO Damage in the United States and the European Un-
ion, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COM'. L. REV. 453, 459-60 (2000).
5 See European Commission, Advance Copy of Working Document of the Commission
Services on Traceability and Labeling of GMOs and Products Derived From GMOs,
ENV/620/2000, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health-consumer/library/press/
press63en.pdf (Nov. 6, 2000).
6 See generally David Byrne, A Challenge for Europe, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
commissioners/byrne/articles/kos-03-02 en.html (2001).
7 Daniel Pruzin, Labeling. United States Reiterates Complaint to WTO on E. U. Labeling
of Genetically Modified Foods, BNA, Sept. 17, 1998, at LEXIS, News Library, BNAITD
File.
8 See generally Byrne, supra note 6.
9 See generally Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Submits Paper to WTO Citing Increase in Biotech-
nology Restrictions, at http://www.biotech-info.net/U.S._submitspaper.html (June 27,
2000).
lId.; see also Ruth MacKenzie & Silvia Francescon, The Regulation of Genetically
Modified Foods in the European Union: An Overview, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 530, 531
(2000).
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law.' Consequently, the United States has looked to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and its accompanying Agreements,
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
("SPS") and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT"), to end
the European Community's restriction on GMO trade and to demonstrate
that Europe's protectionist measures amount to illegal Non-Trade Barriers
("NTBs") according to the current international trade regime.
However, in light of the scientific uncertainty surrounding GM food
and products, and thus, considering the real and potentially dangerous
health and environmental risks posed by GMOs, this comment contends
that European Community restrictions on GMO trade do not serve as NTBs
under current international trade law (the GATT, SPS, and TBT Agree-
ments). Such restrictions should not be considered NTBs in that current in-
ternational trade law has failed to provide clear-cut rules governing
genetically modified products that potentially pose environmental and hu-
man health risks. Furthermore, regardless of the ambiguity of such rules,
Community restrictions on GMO trade do not currently overstep any inter-
national trade boundaries. Thus, despite an occasional trade-slowing effect,
European restrictions on GMOs do not constitute NTBs as currently defined
under international law. Rather, these restrictions seem to be part of a rela-
tively sound policy that both embraces the potential of GMOs and confronts
and controls the risks.
Ultimately, this comment will outline the lively trade debate between
the European Community and the United States, and will do so by starting
from the beginning. Part II will explain the science of GMOs and describe
the technology's value to the "real world" of agriculture. Part III will high-
light the potential risks of genetically modified organisms and outline the
European regulatory regime that has developed in light of these risks. Part
IV will then consider the specific effects of European GMO policies on
trade with the United States and will summarize the resulting EC-U.S. trade
debate. Part V shall discuss the current rules of international trade and
1 Article 281 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community ultimately gives the
European Community a singular legal personality under international law. Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 281, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, consolidated on
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. As an international actor, the
Community has the general capacity, within its field of competence, to enter into obligations
that bind it and its member states to the rules of international law. European Communities
Committee Publication, Select Committees on the European Communities, Tenth Report,
Appendix Four: Note of the Legal Adviser on Competence in the WTO, Sess. 1999-2000,
available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld 1 99900/ldselect/
ldeucom/76/7601.html. Where the Community has bound itself to international law, it has
effectively stated that those laws will reign supreme within the European Community. Id.
The Community has entered into, and has therefore bound itself to the rules of the GATT,
SPS, and TBT Agreements.
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scrutinize the European position under each trade guideline set forth in,
first, the GATT, second, the SPS, and lastly, the TBT. Part VI will com-
prehensively evaluate European GMO trade restrictions in view of current
international trade law. Part VII will conclude that European Community
GMO policies do not amount to NTBs.
II. GMOs EXPLAINED
A. The Science
Genetically modified agriculture is essentially those crops or plants
that carry genetically modified organisms, or rather, strands of foreign ge-
netic material within their cells. 12 Scientists insert these foreign genetic
strands into a plant so that they may "change or supplement one or more of
the plant's traits,"'13 thereby creating a plant that is potentially healthier,
stronger, bigger, and overall, better. In order to genetically modify a crop,
scientists must first isolate genetic material in a plant that is linked to the
trait or process desired to be enhanced or changed.' 4 Then, scientists must
incorporate "desirable" genetic material from some other organism into the
plant that will be modified.
15
Scientists incorporate the genetic material of one organism into another
most commonly through a process known as "recombinant DNA."'16 The
recombinant DNA process involves using plasmids or viruses to carry ge-
netic material into a recipient cell's nucleus. 17 It is in the recipient cell's
nucleus that the new genetic material will, hopefully, be integrated with the
recipient cell's genes, eventually producing the desired trait.1
8
There are other experimental processes by which scientists insert the
genetic material of one organism into another. These processes are known
as, microinjection (new genetic material is directly injected into the recipi-
ent cell), electro and chemical poration (pores are created in the recipient
cell membrane that allow new DNA to enter), and bioballistics (a gun-type
instrument is used to shoot new DNA into the recipient cell).' 9
12 Sophia Kolehmainen, Precaution Before Profits: An Overview of Issues in Genetically
Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 269 (2001).
3id.
14 Id. at 271.
IS See id.
16 Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 51
(2001).17 Michael K. Hansen, Genetic Engineering is Not an Extension of Traditional Plant
Breeding, at http://www.biotech-info.net/wide crosses.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001).
1s See Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 271.-
19 Hansen, supra note 17; see also MARTIN TEITEL & KIMBERLY WILSON, GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED FOOD: CHANGING THE NATURE OF NATURE 19 (1999).
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B. The Application
Agricultural genetic engineering by means of recombinant DNA se-
quencing has truly "opened up a whole range of genetic exchanges that
could never be possible without human interference"; 20 it has greatly ex-
panded our ability to grow, cultivate and produce agriculture and certain ag-
ricultural products. According to many proponents, the technology has
endless possibilities including the ability to improve the environment, en-
hance the nutritional qualities of food, and increase food production.21
Some of the GMO faithful even suggest that genetic modification may re-
duce human suffering and "improve the quality of life, particularly in the
developing world.",22 These sweeping predictions seem quite idealistic con-
sidering the relative "novelty" 23 of agricultural genetic engineering by
means of the recombinant DNA process. Nonetheless, scientists are expect-
ing to achieve the "impossible" through agricultural genetic modification.
However, while some tout the potential of GMOs, others peddle a cau-
tious skepticism. The potential benefits of GMOs are noble in nature and
cause, yet these benefits are only the could-bes of the future. Many people
have begun to fear all that is unknown about GMO technology. Agriculture
has more effect on humans and the environment than any other industry;
people consume its products everyday, and more than a third of the earth's
surface bears its fruits. 24 Because GMO technology is very new and still in
its infant stages, it is impossible to accurately predict its effects on human
and environmental health.25 In 1906, Luther Burbank warned scientists to
take care in the realm of genetic manipulation; he stated, "[w]e recently ad-
vanced our knowledge of genetics to a point where we can manipulate life
in a way never intended by nature. We must proceed with utmost caution in
the application of this new found knowledge. 26 Many GMO opponents,
including the citizens of Europe, have taken the words of Luther Burbank to
heart and have applied them to the new technology.
20 Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 272.
21 Murphy, supra note 16, at 47.
22 id.
23 The recombinant DNA process only became a "theoretical" reality in the late 1970's.
The New Zealand Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, Genetic Modification: An
Overview for Non-Scientists, at http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz/RCGM/pdfs/report/
GMOverview.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2002). And, it was not until 1994 that this method
was successfully applied to plants. Id. Thus, the recombinant DNA process is "novel" in the
sense that it is still a relatively new process.
24 See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1994-1995, 149 (1995).
25 See Fredland, supra note 3, at 184-85.
26 Thomas P. Redick et al., Private Legal Mechanisms for Regulating the Risks of Geneti-
cally Modified Organisms: An Alternative Path Within the Biosafety Protocol, 4 ENVTL. L. 1,
11-12 (1997).
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III. EUROPEAN FEARS AND THE CONSEQUENT REGULATION OF GMOs
European citizens are relatively skeptical and generally wary of any
product containing genetically modified organisms. 27 In fact, many Euro-
pean citizens have "expressed fear that the so-called 'Frankenstein Foods'
may be harmful to health and the environment., 28 Ultimately, European
fears are quite legitimate, as there is much scientific uncertainty surround-
ing GMOs, "[tihough scientists have the skill to remove and insert gene se-
quences in living things, they are not able to control the many variables in
the process. 29
A. The Risks
GMOs undoubtedly open a realm of wondrous possibilities, yet they
also pose serious, life-threatening risks. Specifically, GMOs pose three
known risks to human health. First, experiments have shown that geneti-
cally modified food can "take on the allergenic properties of transferred
foreign genetic material., 30 For example, in an attempt to enhance the nu-
tritional quality of soybeans, a group of scientists injected certain DNA
from a brazil nut into a soybean cell. 31 Researchers ultimately found that
the genetically modified soybean not only obtained positive nutritional
qualities found in the brazil nut, but also the negative quality which makes
some people deathly allergic to the nut.32 Accordingly, consumers allergic
to the brazil nut would also be allergic to the genetically modified soybean.
Second, in order to track the success of genetic modification, scientists
will often introduce a third foreign gene into the process. 33 This gene is
called the "marker gene," and is generally a bacterial gene that is known to
resist certain antibiotics. 34 A bacterial gene is used because if scientists ex-
pose the genes of the genetically modified organism to antibiotics and the
cell survives, then scientists may assume that the antibiotic resistant gene,
accompanied by the desirable piece of DNA, successfully implanted itself
in the recipient cell. 35 Ultimately, the antibiotic resistant trait in the newly
27 Endres, supra note 4, at 460.
28 Fredland, supra note 3, at 183 (citing James Walsh, Alien Seed?: As Genetically Engi-
neered Crops Begin to Enter the Food Chain, Europe Remains a Holdout Against What Eco-
Warriors Call "Frankenstein Foods, " TIME INT'L, Aug. 24, 1998, at 38 (giving an overview
of the European reaction to genetically-modified agriculture)).
29 Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 275.
30 Id. at 278; see also Julie A. Nordlee et al., Identification of a Brazil-Nut Allergen in
Transgenic Soybeans, 334 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 688 (1996).
3, See generally Nordlee et al., supra note 30.
32 id.
33 Richard Caplan & Ellen Hickey, Weird Science: The Brave New World of Genetic En-
gineering, at http://www.pirg.org/ge/press/wierdscience (last visited Mar. 7, 2002).
34 id.
35 Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 277.
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modified organism may be transferred to bacteria within the human body
and the environment. 36 Thus, new strains of antibiotic resistant bacteria
could develop, making disease much harder to control.37
Third, in order to accelerate the activation of foreign genes inside the
recipient cell, and ultimately to achieve desired results at a faster pace, sci-
entists will often inject what is known as the "cauliflower mosaic virus"
into the recipient plant.38 The use of this viral promoter is problematic in
that the cauliflower mosaic virus has demonstrated that it is highly likely to
promote the horizontal transfer of genes between species. 39 This has raised
questions as to whether or not the cauliflower mosaic virus might aid in
bringing about new super-strains of viruses as it advances the inter-species
transfer of genes.4°
Fourth, GMOs also pose serious threats to wildlife. For example, it is
known that certain types of genetically modified plants can kill beneficial
41insects. Specifically, pesticide resistant plants have been known to kill
Monarch butterflies.42 Beneficial insects, such as the Monarch butterfly,
feed on harmful pests that regularly destroy thousands of acres of crops
each year.43 Therefore, if GM crops poison useful insects, it is possible that
pest populations would increase, thereby decreasing "biological diversity
among insects. 4 4
Finally, genetically modified organisms have the potential to affect
ecological stability. Some scientists "warn that crops engineered to resist
pesticides and herbicides could pass those traits on to weeds, resulting in
herbicide and pesticide-tolerant 'superweeds'.,, 45 Both American and Dan-
ish scientists have already demonstrated that "an herbicide-tolerance gene
readily passed from cultivated canola plants to closely-related wild plants,
like wild mustard, in nearby fields. ' 6 Ultimately, scientists cannot accu-
rately predict the results and effects of nature's interaction with genetically
modified plants.47 Thus, there is no way of knowing what kinds of migra-
tions, reproductions, and mutations will occur.
36id.
37 id.
38 Hansen, supra note 19.39 1d.
40 id.
41 See generally J.E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399
NATURE 214 (1999).
42 See generally id.
43 Murphy, supra note 16, at 59.
44 Id.
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The European Community has wisely taken account of these potential
risks. In fact, several European polls have indicated that "high percentages
of European citizens desire the complete segregation of genetically-
modified foods from organically-grown products, and some of those polled
favor banning GMOs altogether. '4 8 In general, European consumers bear a
highly negative attitude toward GM food and products, 49 although attitudes
vary between countries. For example, Germany and Denmark appear to be
more averse toward genetic modification than Britain and Italy.50 Yet, not
one EC country has come forward in full support of GM foods and prod-
ucts. 5' Therefore, EC policy-makers have made the political choice to de-
velop a safety first approach to GMOs 2 The European Commission has
had the difficult task of creating GMO legislation that not only addresses
consumer concerns, but also addresses international trade obligations.53
B. The European Regulatory Regime
In light of a number of potential risks and a general fear of GMOs, the
European Community seems to have selected the "Precautionary Principle"
approach in dealing with GMOs and international trade obligations. 4 The
Precautionary Principle was adopted in 1992 at the Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development. 55 Principle Fifteen of the Rio Declaration
essentially states that "lack of full scientific certainty" should not be used as
an excuse to delay "cost effective measures" that may aid in preventing en-
vironmental degradation. 6 The purpose of the Precautionary Principle is to
shift the burden of proof to the proponents of potentially environmentally
48 Fredland, supra note 3, at 186.
49 See Europa, Consumer Attitudes and Decision-Making with Regard to Genetically
Modified Food Products, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/quality-of-life/gmo/04-
food/04-01-project.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
50Id.
51 Id. It is quite clear that the majority of European consumers bear adverse feelings to-
ward GM food and products. Id. To be sure, there are a few European constituencies that
would like to see GM production flourish. However, these constituencies tend to be the em-
ployees and major shareholders of large GMO producing companies such as the Cebeco
Groep, Pfizer, CHR Hansen, etc. See Northern Light, Major Industry Players, at
http://special.northernlight.com/gmfoods/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2002); see also Daniel Boy,
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Biotechnology and GMOs in Europe: Results
of Eurobarometer 2000, at http://www.cnrs.fr/cw/en/pres/compress/ogm/ogmevolution.html
(Apr. 27, 2000).
52 Endres, supra note 4, at 458.
53 MacKenzie & Francescon, supra note 10, at 532.
54 See Jeffrey K. Francer, Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating Agricul-
tural Biotechnology in the United States and European Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257,
278 (2000).
55 See generally U.N. Conf. on Env't and Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
561d"
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damaging products, and to require them to demonstrate that their products
will not harm or severely damage the environment.57 Ultimately, Principle
Fifteen's "sense of precaution is reflected in the EC regulations," 58 and the
Community believes that such an approach to GMOs both protects its citi-
zens and environment from potential risks and fits within international trade
constraints.
The European Community originally enacted Council Directive
5 9
90/220 to generally regulate the "deliberate release" of GMOs into the envi-
ronment. Directive 90/220 was designed to protect both human health and
the environment from any risks of genetic alteration. 61 Directive 90/220
was also developed as an aid in avoiding the creation of "unequal condi-
tions of competition or barriers to trade in products containing [modified]
organisms" within the EC common market.62
In general, the Directive requires that member states take appropriate
precautions to ensure that "any person' '63 seeking to "release" a GMO notify
the relevant regulatory authority of the state "within whose territory" the
GMO will be released. 64 This notification must include information neces-
sary for evaluating the foreseeable risks that the GMO may pose to human
and/or environmental health. 65 When the competent authority of the mem-
ber state receives GMO notification, the authority must submit a summary
of the notification to the European Community, which immediately distrib-
utes summaries to the authorities of other member states.66 The member
state that received pre-market notification then has ninety days in which to
approve or reject that notification.67 If the competent authority finds that
57 See Francer, supra note 54, at 278 (citing Charmian Barton, The Status of the Precau-
tionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence in Legislation and as a Common Law Doc-
trine, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 509 (1998)).58 Id,
59 Directives are binding on all member states, but a member state may choose the Direc-
tive's form of implementation. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 50-68 (1993) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS].
60 See generally Council Directive 90/220 on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified
Micro-Organisms, part A, art. 2, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15. It is important to note that Council
Directive 90/220 will be replaced by Council Directive 2001/18, effective October 17, 2002.
Directive 2001/18 bears the same structure and purpose as 90/220 but clarifies and improves
upon the "deliberate release" procedures instituted by 90/220. See Council Directive 2001/18
on the Deliberate Release Into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, 2001
O.J. (L 106) 1. Moreover, Directive 2001/18 intertwines ethical, scientific, and legal con-
cerns in a more coherent and practical manner. See id.
61 See generally Council Directive 90/220, supra note 60.
62 Id. at Preamble.
63 Id. at part B, art. 5.
64 See id.
65 See id. at art. 5(a).
66 See id. at art. 9.
67 See Council Directive 90/220, , supra note 60, at art. 6(2).
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the GMO is safe for humans and the environment, the authority must notify
the European Community and other member states.68 If it finds that the
GMO is unsafe, the competent authority may reject the notification and the
application for use throughout the Community.69
If the GMO is ultimately approved, and another member state has not
objected within sixty days of the approval, then the approving state must
give written consent for use of the GMO throughout the Community.7° If
another member state objects to the introduction of a GMO, the European
Community must decide whether or not to consent to the general use of the
GMO.7' If the European Community approves a GMO over a member
state's continued disapproval, that member state may temporarily restrict
marketing. 72 The European Community then has three months to approve
or reject the restriction.73 If the European Community rejects the member
state's restriction, and yet the Community member continues to restrict
marketing of the GMO, legal proceedings can be instituted against that
74member state. Nonetheless, the objecting member state may still have a
valid defense against lifting its particular restriction; the member state may
argue that its restrictions are justified on grounds that its policy is necessary
for the "protection of health and life of humans, animals, or plants., 75
The European Community has also mandated that "food products con-
taining genetically-modified agricultural products be labeled as such., 7 6
European policies suggest that "labeling is a mechanism for risk sharing"
between producers and consumers. "[R]egulation through labeling empow-
ers the consumer in the management of risk., 77 In fact, the European
Community stated that "it is important [for European consumers] to be in-
formed about the use of additives or flavourings genetically modified or
produced by genetic engineering., 78 Thus, "the most satisfactory solution.
will be to draw up a Community [labeling] provision." 79
The European Community has enacted two Regulations 80 to cope with
68 See id. at art. 3(8).
69 See id. at arts. 12(1), 12(2)(b).
70 See id. at art. 13(2).
71 See id. at arts. 13(3), 21.
72 See id. at art. 16.
73 See Council Directive 90/220, supra note 60.
74 See generally, EC TREATY, supra note 11.
15 See id. at art. 36.
76 Fredland, supra note 3, at 183.
77 See Francer, supra note 54, at 265, n.77.
78 Commission Decision 98/613/EC Concerning a Draft Decree of the Republic of Aus-
tria on the Identification of Genetically Modified Additives and Flavourings Used as Food
Ingredients, 6, 1998 O.J. (L 291) 35 [hereinafter Commission Decision 98/613/EC].79
/d. at 10.
80 E.U. Regulations are binding in their entirety as law for a member state. See CASES
AND MATERIALS, supra note 59, at 74-75.
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the issue of labeling. First, Regulation 258/97 states that a product contain-
ing novel ingredients (which are those products containing GMOs, or those
that have a modified molecular structure) must somehow make consumers
aware that there is an ingredient within the product that is "not present in an
existing equivalent foodstuff.",8 1 Second, Regulation 1139/98, which ap-
plies to GM maize varieties and GM soy varieties not covered by 258/97,
requires that the list of ingredients (or some other clear location on the
product) include the words "produced from genetically modified soya," or
"produced from genetically modified maize," etc.82
IV. THE EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The volume of trade between the United States and the European
Community is larger than that of any other trading relationship in the
world.83 Certainly, such a relationship is not without its troubles, but these
trading partners have never encountered such a problematic issue as GMOs.
The United States, as the leading producer of GMOs, 84 has continually
touted their potential benefits. The European Community, on the other
hand, has shown its trepidation by enacting both Directives and Regulations
governing the use of GMOs. The United States believes that EC legislation
has shut its agricultural goods out of the Community market.85 As such, a
trade impasse has developed between the United States and the European
Community over GMOs.
A. The Effects of EC Legislation on Trade with the United States
The United States is the leading developer and exporter of genetically
modified agriculture and products. 86 In fact, approximately sixty million
acres of U.S. farmland are covered in genetically modified corn, soybeans,
canola, and cotton.87 GMO crops account for "at least forty-five percent of
cotton, thirty-eight percent of soybeans, and twenty-five percent of corn
81 Council Regulation 258/97 Concerning the Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients,
art. 8(1)(c), 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1, 5.
82 Council Regulation 1139/98 Concerning the Compulsory Indication of the Labeling of
Certain Foodstuffs Produced from Genetically Modified Organisms of Particulars Other
Than Those Provided for in Directive 79/112/EEC, art. 2(3)(a)-(b), 1998 O.J. (L 159) 4, 6
[hereinafter Council Regulation 1139/98].83 Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, F'olicy in Flux: The European Union's Laws
on Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effect on International Trade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 243, 246 (1999).84 Endres, supra note 4, at 459.85 Jennifer Coderre, Biotechnology: Agriculture Officials Urge Outreach to Convince
Europe of GMOs'Benefits, BNA, Mar. 5, 1999, at LEXIS, News Library, BNAITD File.
Endres, supra note 4, at 459.87 Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 269.
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grown. 8 And, "within a few years virtually one hundred percent of U.S.
agricultural commodity exports will be genetically modified or mixed with
GMO products."
89
It is clear that the presence of GMOs is generally accepted by Ameri-
can food producers90 and is advocated by large technology companies like
DuPont, Dow AgroSciences, and Aventis. Such companies and producers
rely heavily on the export and purchase of genetically modified crops and
goods in order to generate higher profits and to finance research and devel-
opment.91 But, the European Community, which is a major market for U.S.
agricultural products, "has a 'slow unpredictable process for approving new
U.S. agricultural products developed through advanced biotechnology.'
92
Consequently, European restrictions on GMO trade have created several
problems for U.S. agricultural producers and major technological compa-
nies.
The European Community's general regulatory scheme has made it
very difficult for the United States to export products to the European mar-
ket.93 The approval process may involve long delays and millions of dollars
lost in what were potential exports. For example, in 1996, the United States
exported $3 billion in genetically modified and conventional corn and soy-
beans to the European Community. 94 Due to the introduction of EC Direc-
88 Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and
the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 177 (2000).
89 Endres, supra note 4, at 459-460 (quoting a U.S. State Department Official during tes-
timony before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade).
90 Symposium, Transgenic Agriculture: Biosafety and International Trade, 4 B.U. J. SCi.
& TECH. L. 4, 29 (1998).
91 See Northern Light, supra note 51. American consumers, it seems, also support the
presence of GMOs in food and food products; after all, American supermarkets tend to sell
genetically modified products with ease - the shelves are restocked with GM products each
night. It may be that Americans are simply unaware that they are buying genetically modi-
fied products. In 1992, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") determined that it would
not treat GM foods any differently than "natural" foods. Donna U. Vogt & Brian A. Jack-
son, Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods, at http://www.agriculturelaw.com/
aglibrary/articles/labelmar20_00.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2002). Thus, there has not been
much debate over, or advertising about, GMOs in the consumer realm. Moreover, producers
are not required to place special labels upon their GMO products. Consequently, the average
American consumer is unfamiliar with GMOs and may be unaware that she is buying a ge-
netically modified product. See id.
92 Endres, supra note 4, at 460 (quoting Ambassador David L. Aaron, Under Secretary of
Commerce for International Trade).
93 Fredland, supra note 3, at 191.
94 Ved P. Nanda, Genetically Modified Food and International Law - The Biosafety Pro-
tocol and Regulations in Europe, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 235, 237-38 (2000). EC re-
strictions on GM imports have cost the U.S. $300 million in corn exports alone. See Gary G.
Yerkey, E. U. Likely to Begin Clearing Imports of GMO Products This Fall, Official Says,
INT'L TRADE REP., March 7, 2002, at 408.
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tive 90/220, these exports dropped to approximately $1 billion in 1999.95
Even if a GM export is approved by the Commission, European states can
make the introduction of GM products difficult in their individual mar-
kets.96 The result appears to be another hindrance to trade.
The European Community's labeling requirements also create at least
three problems for U.S. agricultural producers. 97 First, labeling require-
ments force U.S. producers to "brand products in a fashion that will be cer-
tain to repulse a significant portion of the European populace." 98 Second,
U.S. producers find it extremely difficult to separate, for labeling purposes,
products containing GMOs from those that are considered "organic"; GM
crops look the same as organic crops, and therefore, separating the two dur-
ing "harvesting, storage, and transport is difficult."99 Third, it is very diffi-
cult to create purely organic crops or foodstuffs and, because the European
Community has failed to specify criteria for testing for the presence of
GMOs, U.S. producers have been left confused as to whether their products
meet European specifications.' 00
B. The Trade Debate Brewing Between the European Community and the
United States
Considering the effect that EC GMO legislation has had upon U.S. ex-
ports, the United States has "tended to see E.U. measures, and their applica-
tion in practice, as thinly disguised protectionism."' 0 ' On the other hand,
some Europeans see EC legislation as "foisting genetically modified prod-
ucts onto unwilling consumers."' 0 2 The European Community appears to
have passed its requirements without express protective intent-there does
not seem to be a conspiracy aimed at protecting European farmers. 103
Nonetheless, EC legislation may make U.S. farmers less competitive in the
European market. Therefore, the U.S. has turned to the GATT 10 4 and its ac-
companying Agreements, the SPS 10 5 and the TBT,10 6 for aid in this trade
95 Nanda, supra note 94, at 237-38.
96 Francer, supra note 54, at 281.
97 Fredland, supra note 3, at 191.
98 See id.
99 Id.
'oo See id.101 MacKenzie & Francescon, supra note 10, at 531.
102 id.
103 Fredland, supra note 3, at 183.
104 See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].105 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15,
1993, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
106 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter TBT Agreement].
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conflict.
V. THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE GATT, SPS, AND TBT
The United States believes that European measures against GMOs
serve as non-trade barriers ("NTBs") against U.S. produced agriculture.
NTBs violate international trade law, specifically Article III of the GATT.
In general, the GATT promotes the international economy by reducing bar-
riers to trade through the elimination of protective treatment of domestic
goods. 0 7 In particular, Article III (the "National Treatment" Clause) pro-
hibits internal taxes and regulations that protect domestic production.' 0 8 Ar-
ticle III, however, is excepted by Article XX, which allows members to
make regulations that otherwise violate the GATT when such restrictions
are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."' 0 9 The
European Community, it appears, has relied on Article XX in asserting that
its regulatory measures are absolutely necessary to protect European con-
sumers from the potential risks posed by GMOs."° However, the 1994
Uruguay Round produced two Agreements, the SPS and TBT Agreements,
which restrict the use of Article XX defenses."'
A. The SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement attempts to clarify Article XX by describing situa-
tions in which trade discrimination is permissible to protect health and the
environment."i 2 The SPS Agreement requires that protective measures con-
cerning human, animal, or plant life be scientifically supported, not be arbi-
trary or unjustifiable, and ultimately follow internationally accepted
standards of regulation.' 13 The United States has challenged EC GMO
legislation in light of the SPS Agreement.
First, the United States suggests that EC Directive 90/220 does not
meet the "scientifically supported" requirement of the SPS Agreement."14
This requirement appears to be two-pronged.' 15 These two prongs call for
protective measures that are: (1) "based on" a risk assessment and not
07 See generally GATT, supra note 104.
08 See generally id. at art. Ill.
09 Id. at Art. XX(b), I I(b).
11o See Fredland, supra note 3, at 196-200.
111 See Rick Franzen, Will GA TT Take a Bite Out of the Organic Food Production Act of
1990?, 7 MrNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 399, 409 (1998).
112 See Layla Hughes, Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO
Appellate Body Beef Hormone Decision, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 915, 917 (1998).
113 See generally SPS Agreement, supra note 105.
''
4 Id. at arts. 2, T 2, 5 1-3.
115 See Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO From Becoming the "World Trans-Science
Organization ": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy and Factfinding in the Growth Hor-
mones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 271-72 (1998).
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"maintained without sufficient scientific evidence" and, (2) "necessary" in
order to achieve the regulator's selected level of protection, while minimiz-
ing collateral effects on international trade."
6
A proper risk assessment would, or should, generally involve investi-
gating all "available scientific evidence." 117 As far as GMOs, no existing
scientific evidence shows that GMOs positively pose serious threats to hu-
man or environmental health. However, the evidence does not show that
there are no risks either. In general, there is great scientific uncertainty sur-
rounding GMOs:
One of the greatest concerns about genetically engineered crops and food is the
fact that so much is unknown and, at this time, unknowable. Though scientists
have the skill to remove and insert gene sequences in living things, they are not
able to control the many variables in the process." 8
Genetic engineering of agriculture is still in its infant stages and we do
not know if GMOs will positively, negatively, or neutrally affect our health
and environment. Nonetheless, we do know that GMOs potentially pose
real threats. For example, a study conducted by Dr. Ampad Pusztai, for-
merly of the Towett Research Institute, found that rats who were fed geneti-
cally modified potatoes suffered weight loss, internal organ damage, and
suppression of their immune systems after a certain period of consump-
tion.'' 9
Ultimately, scientific experimentation has proved the potential for dan-
gerous health120 (allergenic, antibiotic resistance, and virus promotion) and
environmental'12 (genetic pollution and harm to wildlife) risks. The other
side cannot negate this potential, but can only say, with equal scientific un-
certainty, that they do not believe the potential risks will manifest them-
selves in a significant way. In the end, each side of the debate can find
scientific evidence that supports its point of view and seems to refute that of
its opponents.122 Thus, the question becomes, how much risk is too much
risk, and who gets to draw that line? In the face of such scientific uncer-
tainty, the European Community has drawn its line, and "based" Directive
116 See id. at 271; see also SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 2, 2.
l:7 SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 5, j 2.
1 8 Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 275.
119 See id. at 276; see also Fredland, supra note 3, at 188.
120 See Discussion in Section 111(A) of this Comment; see also Martin Enserink, Prelimi-
nary Data Touch Off Genetic Food Fight, 283 Sci. 1094 (1999).
1 See id.; see also Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 276-77.
122 Compare GM Foods Debate Needs a Recipe for Restoring Trust, 398 NATURE 175
(1999) with Union of Concerned Scientists, Risks of Genetic Engineering, at http://
www.ucsusa.org/food and environment/biotechnology/page.cfmpagelD=346 (last modi-
fied Oct. 30, 2002).
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90/220 on an appropriate risk assessment by considering all the "available
scientific evidence."'
123
The next question under the SPS Agreement is whether the European
Community's Directive is "necessary" in order to achieve its selected level
of protection while minimizing collateral effects on international trade.
24
First, if items subject to regulation do not, in reality, have a known harmful
effect on human health or the environment, then the regulations in question
cannot be considered "effective" for achieving their protective goal and
therefore, are not necessary. 125 Certainly, one could argue that as of yet, the
world has not seen any major GMO-caused disasters. Nonetheless, real life
has shown that plants modified to produce pesticide ultimately kill benefi-
cial insects like Monarch butterflies. 126 We also know that, in reality, indi-
viduals allergic to brazil nuts would also be allergic to, for example,
soybeans modified with brazil-nut DNA. 1
27
Ultimately, science has shown us that GMOs are risky and do have
some very harmful effects. And, while every human activity bears some
risk, those risks are often relatively minimal compared to the life-
threatening and life-altering risks posed by GMOs. For example, potential
ecological disaster through the destruction of Monarch butterflies unques-
tionably poses greater risks to humans and the environment than, for in-
stance, consuming caffeine. And, if an activity does potentially pose a
severe risk, like GMOs, the world generally tends to take every precaution
necessary. Thus, it seems that EC legislation is, for now, correctly respond-
ing to both perceived and real risks, and therefore effectively protecting
humans and the environment from these risks.
The second part of the "necessary" test involves the issue of whether or
not EC legislation minimizes collateral effects on international trade. Cur-
rently, the EC Directive is at least less harmful to international trade than
individual restrictions proposed by individual states would have been; for
example, Norway banned all products coming from crops that contained an-
tibiotic-resistant marker genes.128 In light of this, the fact that GM engi-
neering is in its infant stages, and that real risks do exist, it is possible that
the EC's Directive is "necessary" to protect human health, the environment,
and to facilitate at least some trade in GMOs. At this juncture, scientific
evidence has not provided us with the ability to know what is necessary and
what is not, and therefore, which GMO restrictions will or will not be "ef-
123 SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 5, 2.
124 Walker, supra note 115, at 271.
125 id.
126 See generally Losey, supra note 41.
27 See generally Nordlee et al., supra note 30.
128 Nigel Williams, Agricultural Biotech Faces Backlash in Europe, 281 Sci. 768, 768
(1998).
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fective" in achieving human and environmental protection.
Second, it seems the United States believes that the EC Directive fails
to fulfill the arbitrary or unjustifiable distinction 12 9 requirement of the SPS
Agreement, which condemns measures that "result in discrimination or dis-
guised restriction on trade."' 30 Any restrictions on trade should only be
found "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate" in the "most blatant and
unexplainable cases."' 131 In the current GMO trade dispute, "[n]o equally
obvious counterpart to genetically-modified agriculture is permitted to enter
the European markets unscathed by regulations."'' 32 More importantly, the
same restrictions must be applied to GM agriculture produced in the Euro-
pean Community.133 Therefore, EC measures against GM agriculture do
not seem to arbitrarily, unjustifiably or blatantly discriminate against
international trade.
Third, it seems the United States believes that the EC Directive may
violate the internationally-accepted standards 34 requirement of the SPS
Agreement. 135 The Agreement defines internationally-accepted standards
(for measures aimed at protecting human health and the environment) as
those found in the Codex Alimentarius Commission.1 36 The Codex recom-
mends special treatment for products in which genetic modification has cre-
ated a material difference from non-modified products. 137 Essentially, the
presence of "marker genes and powerful promoters, the insertion of genes
from other species ... into plants that could never come together in nature,
and even the technology itself" provide evidence that GM products are ma-
terially different from "traditional" agricultural products.' 38 Moreover,
common sense tells us that, for example, a plant modified to internally pro-
duce the Bacillus thuringiensis (B.t.) insecticide is materially different from
the original plant that does not naturally produce any insect toxin.' 39 Also,
a soybean modified to demonstrate brazil nut properties is materially differ-
ent from a soybean that naturally demonstrates only soybean properties. 140
If we are not convinced by common sense, science tells us that the introduc-
tion of foreign genetic material alters a plant's genetic makeup, creating an
129 SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 2, 3.
130 Id. at art. 5, 5.
'3" Fredland, supra note 3, at 205 (citing Walker, supra note 115, at 270).
Id. at 215.
'13 See id. at 191.
134 SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 3, 1-3.
135 Pruzin, supra note 9.
136 SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at Annex A, 3.
137 Fredland, supra note 3, at 215.
138 Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 284.
19 See id. at 273.
140 See id. at 278.
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entirely new plant with its own unique genetic structure.' 4' Thus, GMO
products are materially different from their "natural" counterparts and, un-
der the Codex, can be accorded special treatment.
B. The TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement also attempts to clarify GATT, Article XX by en-
suring that technical regulations used to "protect human, animal or plant life
or health,"'142 do not create "unnecessary obstacles to international trade.'
' 43
More importantly, the TBT Agreement states that technical regulations
must "fulfill a legitimate objective."' 144
The United States has challenged the European labeling regulations
under the TBT Agreement. First, the United States appears to believe that
EC labeling requirements fail to fulfill a legitimate objective.145 However,
the TBT Agreement may consider a state's desire for uniform regulation as
a legitimate goal.146 As several different European governments had, in the
past, passed individual legislation regulating the labeling of products con-
taining GMOs, 147 the European Community's current labeling requirements
have helped to promote legal uniformity and have harmonized legislative
differences that were "liable to impede the free movement of [GMOs] and
thereby adversely affect the functioning of the internal market."'148 In light
of this, it seems the EC's regulations have achieved legitimate objectives -
uniformity and harmonization - and have thus satisfied this requirement of
the TBT Agreement.
Second, the United States seems to believe that EC labeling require-
ments are unnecessary obstacles to trade. Yet, while EC regulations are not
perfectly conducive to the complete free-flow of international trade, one
might hesitate to call them unnecessary obstacles. Considering the world
as it exists,free-flowing trade is somewhat of a misnomer. Each trade item
confronts at least one obstacle at some point during its route; these trade ob-
stacles vary in difficulty and include customs, quotas, and quarantines. The
question becomes whether the obstacles pertaining to GMOs are too diffi-
cult to hurdle-are they too excessive or unnecessary?
Certainly, EC labeling regulations may create obstacles to trade in that
141 Union of Concerned Scientists, Risks of Genetic Engineering, at http://
www.ucsusa.org/food-and-environment/biotechnology/page.cfm?pagelD=346 (last modi-
fied Oct. 30, 2002).
142 GATT, supra note 104, at art. XX(b), (b).
"43 TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at Preamble.
144 Id. at art. 2, 2.
145 id.
146 See id.
147 Fredland, supra note 3, at 189.
148 Id. at 189-90 (quoting Council Regulation 1139/98, supra note 82, at art. 1.1, 4).
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a skeptical European public is less likely to knowingly buy products labeled
as containing GMOs. However, a skeptical European public is just as likely
to skip over a product whose contents are unknown; if agricultural produc-
ers do not have to label their products, and consequently choose not to label
their goods, European consumers may assume the producer has something
to hide-namely GMOs.
Also, labeling requirements may cause the production of GM foods to
be more costly.' 49 First, farmers will be forced to develop more effective
separation techniques in order to ensure that GM crops and natural crops
are adequately separated.150 Second, scientifically determining which prod-
ucts do or do not contain miniscule amounts of GMOs could also be very
costly.' 5' Nonetheless, these surges in cost will be equally passed on to all
producers of GM agriculture, including those members of the Commu-
nity.' 52 The United States may be disproportionately affected, but the regu-
lations and any obstacle-like effects they produce apply equally to all GM
agricultural producers. 
5 3
Ultimately, EC regulations may have actually made it much easier for
some GMOs to enter the European market-GMOs that never would have
entered the market if individual European countries were allowed to legis-
late the matter.' 54 More importantly however, GMOs do get traded in the
European market. For example, four types of GM maize are traded in the
European Union including Novartis' genetically modified maize, which has
been circulating throughout Europe despite serious objections.155 Consider-
ing this, the obstacle does not appear to be insurmountable.
VI. EC REGULATIONS Do NOT AMOUNT TO NTBS
In light of current international trade law (the GATT, SPS, and TBT
Agreements), EC measures against GMOs do not equate to NTBs. As con-
cluded above, the EC's legislation over GMOs has not violated Article III
of the GATT because the European Community has a valid Article XX de-
fense-its Directive and Regulations are "necessary to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life or health."'156 Of course, the SPS and TBT Agreements
restrict Art. XX defenses. Nonetheless, the European Community's GMO
legislation does not violate these Agreements either.





154 See Williams, supra note 128.
155 See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 83, at 284-85; see also Francer, supra note 54, at
277-78 (discussing Novartis' maize).
156 GATT, supra note 104, at art. XX, l(b).
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A. EC GMO Legislation in Light of the SPS Agreement
First, the scientifically supported requirement of the SPS Agreement
essentially states that a protective measure must be "based on" a risk as-
sessment and "not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence." 157 In
light of the scientific uncertainty surrounding GM food and products, the
European Community has based its GMO legislation on an appropriate risk
assessment considering the real and potentially dangerous health and envi-
ronmental risks posed by GMOs. Again, the potential for these risks to
manifest has been confirmed through scientific experimentation.1 58 Thus,
EC measures have not been maintained without scientific evidence. Propo-
nents of GMOs cannot negate the risk potential of GM products; they can
only say with equal uncertainty that they do not think the potential risks will
manifest themselves in a significant way.
Also, because GM engineering is in its infant stages, it is possible that
the European Community's restrictions on GMO trade are necessary to pro-
tect human health and the environment.1 59 At this juncture, scientific evi-
dence has not provided us with the ability to know what is, or what is not
necessary. Moreover, the European Community's GMO legislation may
have "minimized collateral effects on international trade" by creating a sin-
gle European market for GM products.160 The EC measures are at least less
harmful to international trade than individual restrictions proposed by indi-
vidual states would have been-especially considering the fact that some
states attempted to ban GM crops and their products altogether.'
6 1
Second, EC restrictions on GMO trade do not "arbitrarily or unjustifia-
bly discriminate" between U.S. GM products and other GM products. All
GM foods must undergo the same scrutiny before being introduced into free
circulation in the European market. More importantly, European GM agri-
culture must also undergo the same restrictions.' 62 Therefore, EC measures
against GM agriculture do not seem to "arbitrarily or unjustifiably discrimi-
nate" against international trade. 1
63
Lastly, if we apply current international standards to GMOs, we find
that the Codex recommends special treatment for those products in which
genetic modification has created a material difference from the original,
natural product. 164 Essentially, the presence of foreign genes within a plant
creates an entirely new entity, making the GM plant materially different
157 SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 2, 2.
58 See Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 276-77; see also Martin Enserink, supra note 120.
159 See SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 2, 1.
160 See Walker, supra note 115, at 271.
161 See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 28, at 38.
162 See Fredland, supra note 3, at 215.
163 SPS Agreement, supra note 105, at art. 2, 3.
64 Fredland, supra note 3, at 215.
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from the original.165 Thus, EC restrictions on GMO trade comply with in-
ternationally accepted standards.
B. EC GMO Regulations in Light of the TBT Agreement
First, the EC labeling regulations appear to have satisfied the legitimate
objective requirement 166 as the TBT Agreement may consider the desire for
uniform regulation legitimate. 167 Many individual European states had im-
plemented anti-GMO policies ranging from Norway's complete ban on all
products containing antibiotic-resistant marker genes, to France's "go-
slow" approval of new GMO varieties. 168 The European Community de-
veloped GMO regulations in order to combat these individual state actions
that had the potential to "impede the free movement of [GMOs] and thereby
adversely affect the functioning of the internal market."'' 69 Essentially,
then, the European Community's attempt to legislate against these wide-
ranging policies and to create uniformity of treatment in the Community has
satisfied the "legitimate objective requirement" of the TBT Agreement.
Second, it is not clear that EC labeling requirements are unnecessary
obstacles to trade. There is no doubt that a skeptical European public is less
likely to knowingly buy products labeled as "containing GMOs." However,
a skeptical European public is just as likely to skip over a product whose
contents are unknown. More importantly, labeling requirements may cause
the production of GM foods to be more costly. 70 Yet, any surge in cost
will be equally passed on to all producers of GM agriculture, including
those producing members of the European Community.' 7' The United
States may be disproportionately affected, but the Regulations and their ef-
fects apply equally to all GM agricultural producers.' 72 Certainly, while EC
Regulations are not perfectly conducive to the complete free-flow of inter-
national trade, it is not clear that we can call them "unnecessary obstacles."
EC regulations may actually have made it much easier for some GMOs to
enter the European market.' 73 More importantly, GMOs do get traded in
Europe. For example, four types of GM maize have been widely circulated
in the Community despite objections made by member states. 74
165 See generally Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 273.
166 TBT Agreement, supra note 106, at art. 2, 2.
167 See generally id.
168 Williams, supra note 128, at 768.
169 Fredland, supra note 3, at 189-90 (quoting Council Regulation 1139/98, supra note
82, at Art. 1.1, 4).
7 0 See id. at 191.
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See Williams, supra note 128, at 768.
174 See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 83, at 284-85.
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In view of all this, it does not seem that the EC Regulations pose too
much of a threat to international trade, especially when one considers the
scientific uncertainty and potential risks surrounding GM products; it is
quite likely that the EC's Regulations are "necessary" to protect human
health and the environment. Thus, it is not clear, at least at this juncture,
that EC regulations are unnecessary obstacles.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that States can only go as far as the WTO, the SPS
and TBT Agreements allow considering international law reigns supreme.
Nonetheless, the line drawn by each of the above Agreements becomes
somewhat "fuzzy" when human and environmental health is potentially
threatened. Yet, it is clear that EC restrictions on GMO trade: (1) are based
on a proper risk assessment considering all available scientific evidence, (2)
have minimized collateral effects on international trade, (3) are not arbitrary
or unjustifiable, (4) conform to international standards, (5) satisfy a legiti-
mate objective, and (6) are ultimately necessary considering all that is un-
known about GMOs. Therefore, the Community's Directive and
Regulations do not overshoot the boundaries of current international law
and Europe's Precautionary Principle approach obeys the rules of interna-
tional trade.
States and their agencies "need time to understand GMO technology
and comprehend its full range of possible effects before knowing how to
regulate it most effectively."'' 7 5 At this stage, the world just does not know
enough about GMOs to create the "perfect" regulatory system. The current
relevant question is how much risk is too much risk, and where do States
draw the line? The Europeans have made that decision, and for now, with a
world of information left to gather on the benefits and risks of GMOs, their
decision is acceptable.
For certain, a delicate balance must be struck in terms of regulating the
trade of GMOs. Over-regulation of GM products has the potential to wreak
havoc on our established free-trade regime and could diminish any potential
benefits GMOs may have on food production. Under-regulation, on the
other hand, may spell disaster for human health and the environment. The
truth is, "[o]nce the technology escapes, we cannot take it back.' 76 Thus,
we must take the time to ensure that GMOs are safe.
When it comes to biotechnology and GMOs, we currently live in a
world of "potentials," and neither the GATT, SPS, or TBT Agreements
provide clear-cut rules for these "would be" situations. The world could
certainly use all the benefits GMOs have to offer, but can we handle the
175 Kolehmainen, supra note 12, at 288.
176 Stone, supra note 2, at 705.
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risks? EC GMO legislation has offered Europe a way to keep on moving
forward, albeit slowly. The European precautionary approach may allow
the world to eventually take hold of all the potential positives of biotech-
nology while confronting the risks before they potentially get out of control.
Thus, it seems that, for now, EC restrictions on GMO trade are acceptable.
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